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1 Introduction
Recent research has shown how explicitly modelling the network structure of social and
economic relations can provide significant theoretical insights, as well as account for previ-
ously unexplained empirical observations. Relevant areas of application range from labour
markets (Calvo-Armengol 2004; Calvo-Armengol and Jackson 2004), to the diffusion of
opinions and diseases (Jackson 2008), trade and financial markets (Eliott et al. 2013), R&D
collaborations (Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez 2001), friendship and peer effects identification
(Currarini et al. 2009, 2010), and the adoption of health related behaviours (Christakis and
Fowler 2002).
Network theory is particularly well-suited to analysing problems where social distance
affects the nature and extent of economic interactions. In a network, agents interact only with
a subset of other agents called the neighbours. For instance, in labour markets, information
on job vacancies mainly flows along social ties. Likewise, people’s behaviours and habits are
affected by those of friends, relatives and colleagues with whom they interact, whom they
imitate, and whose actions have an impact on their welfare. Research in network economics
has addressed two distinct, though strictly related, issues: (i) how network structures affect
the behaviour of social and economic actors; (ii) what incentives agents face in forming
the network by means of link creation and deletion (which in turn begs the question how
these incentives relate to social incentives, and how efficient are the resulting architectures).
Investigation of the above issues has shown that the network structure of career advice
can generate unemployment patterns that match the observed correlation and persistence
of unemployment much better than classical models do (e.g., Calvo-Armengol and Jackson
2004; Calvo-Armengol 2004). Furthermore, we have learned that the effect of changing the
topology of a social network crucially depends on the strategic features of social interactions
(i.e. whether they are substitutes or complements) (e.g., Galeotti et al. 2010); and that the
ethnic biases in the way students form friendships originate both from institutional constraints
and from preferences that are not race-blind but favour one’s own ethnic group (e.g., Currarini
et al. (2009)).
Local interactions and network structures appear to be a prominent feature of many envi-
ronmental problems. Without having the ambition to be exhaustive, this paper nonetheless
considers a wide range of issues and potential areas of application, including: (i) the role
of relational networks in the pattern of adoption and the speed of diffusion of green tech-
nologies; (ii) common pool resource problems characterized by a multiplicity of sources and
users interlinked by an extraction network; (iii) the role of social networks in multi-level
environmental governance; (iv) infrastructural networks in the access to and use of natural
resources such as oil and natural gas; (v) the use of networks to describe the internal struc-
ture of inter-country relations in international agreements, and how this affects the stability
of cooperation; and (vi) the formation of bilateral “links” in the process of building up an
environmental coalition.
For each of these areas, we examine why and how network economics would be an
effective conceptual and analytical tool, and discuss the main insights that we can foresee.
We do this by reviewing relevant yet still limited contributions within this emerging research
field, discussing new frameworks of analysis, and identifying open issues and questions for
future research.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the fundamental elements of
network analysis, and presents some of the key indices that are used to capture the structural
features of a network and compare different architectures. Furthermore, it discusses how the
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network is likely to affect agents’ actions, behaviours and welfare; and what forces/incentives
are behind the process of network formation. In Sect. 3 we seek to map the linkages between
network economics and the environment by focusing on specific environmental issues/areas
and analysing in greater detail how the use of networks can provide new insights for both
theory and practice. Section 4 draws some conclusions.
2 Network Economics: Key Features and Concepts
In this section we introduce some fundamental concepts and notations about networks. For
a more complete and detailed treatment we refer the reader to Jackson (2008).
2.1 Definitions
2.1.1 Networks
We define a network starting from a set N of nodes. In applications, nodes usually represent
socio economic agents, such as firms, consumers, countries, etc . . . A network g can be
defined as a subset of the set of all pairs of elements in N : g ⊆ {i j : i ∈ N , j ∈ N }. When
the order of pairs matters, we say the network is directed, otherwise we say that the network
is undirected (that is, in an undirected network i j ∈ g → j i ∈ g). A pair i j ∈ g is called a
link or a tie. Although links can carry an associated real number, which is usually interpreted
as the strength of the link, in most economic applications such weights are set to either 1
(the link is there) or 0 (the links is absent), and g is a non-weighted network. We will denote
by g − i j the network obtained by deleting the link i j from g, and by g + i j the network
obtained by adding the link i j to g.
An alternative way to represent a network is by means of the adjacency matrix G, whose
generic entry gi j measures the strength of the link between nodes i and j in g. When the
network is undirected, the adjacency matrix is symmetric; when links are not weighted, the
matrix only contains zeros and ones. The generic element gmi j of the m − th power of the
matrix G counts how many paths of length m are present in g between i and j .
The neighbourhood of node i in the non-weighted network g is the set of nodes that
are linked to i in g. The number of such nodes—called the neighbours of i—is called the
degree of i in g. If all nodes are linked to all other nodes we have the complete network.
Notable architectures include (i) minimally connected networks (trees); (ii) regular networks,
where all nodes have the same degree (a special case is the circle, where all nodes have two
neighbours); and (iii) core-periphery architectures, which are networks where a subset of
nodes—the core—is linked to all nodes in the network and the rest of the nodes are only
linked to nodes in the core (a special case is the star, where the core includes a single node).
See Fig. 1.
2.1.2 Paths and Connectedness
A walk in the network g is a sequence of adjacent links in g. Formally, a walk is a sequence
{i0i1, i1i2, . . . , im−1im} such that i p−1i p ∈ g for all p = 1, . . . , m. When such walk exists,
we say that the two nodes i0, im are connected in g. A walk such that i0 = im is called a
cycle. When the walk never goes twice through the same node we have a path. When there
are several paths connecting nodes i0 and im , we consider the shortest of these paths to define
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Fig. 1 Examples of network architectures
the geodesic distance between i0 and im as the number of links in this shortest path. We say
that the network g is connected if for each pair of nodes there exists a connecting path.
2.1.3 Sub-networks and Components
A sub-network h ⊂ g is a network with set of nodes S ⊆ N and such that i j ∈ h → i j ∈ g.
For any subset S ⊂ N we define the restriction of g to S as the sub-network with set of nodes
S and with the links in g that only involve nodes in S. The restriction of g to S is denoted by
g|S . We say that the subset of nodes S ⊂ N is connected in g if g|S is connected. A maximal
connected sub-network of g is called a component of g. By definition, a component h of g
is such that no link is present in g between nodes in the component and nodes outside the
component. Each component h ⊂ g identifies a subset of nodes N (h) ⊆ N ; it is clear that
N (h)∩ N (h′) = ∅ and that ⋃h N (h) = N . The partition of N defined by all subsets N (h)
is denoted by π (g). So if, for instance, g = {12, 23, 45}, then there are two components,
h1 = {12, 23} and h2 = {45}, and π (g) = {{123} , {45}}.
2.2 Representing Networks
Networks are mathematically complex structures. Yet, we can capture some basic structural
properties and compare different networks by looking at simple indices, whose qualitative
features are briefly described below.
2.2.1 Connectivity and Cohesion
A first basic question is how connected or dense a network is. A first, rough measure is given
by the number of links in the network; to be able to compare networks of different sizes,
one looks at the average degree; that is, the average number of neighbours nodes have. It
is clear that networks with similar number of nodes may present very different topologies,
which we would naturally associate with different measures of density. For instance, one may
be interested in how far any randomly picked pair of nodes is in the network—the average
distance. A different type of information is given by the diameter of a network, the maximal
geodesic distance between any two nodes. If for instance, the diameter of g is 6, it means
that it takes at most 6 steps to go from any node to any other node in the network.
Another related feature is network cohesiveness, which aims at capturing how firmly
together a group of nodes is in the network. Obviously, adding links to a given network can
only increase any reasonable measure of cohesiveness. This is, of course, very different from
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saying that a larger number of links means that a network is more cohesive. To make things
clear, consider a star network and a circle. In the star, the removal of a single node is enough
to break up the network in two separate components. In the circle, it takes at least two nodes
to do it. This can be interpreted as a higher cohesiveness of the circle relative to the star.
In general, we can define a cut-set for the connected network g as a set of nodes that, if
removed from g, would break up g into two or more components. The minimal cardinality
of cut-sets of g is the smallest number of nodes that would suffice to break up connectedness
of g. A common measure of cohesiveness for g is then the cardinality of the smallest cut-set.
A similar measure can be applied to any connected subgraph of g, measuring therefore how
cohesive a sub-group of nodes is in g. A celebrated result in graph theory states that if k is
such minimal size for g, then there exist, for any pair of nodes, at least k connecting paths
with empty intersection. This property relates this measure of cohesiveness with a measure
of diversification of communication flows between agents in the network. One may also
be interested in the vulnerability of a network to the removal of subsets of nodes that are
themselves connected in the network. This is an important issue, for instance, if the possibility
of such removal is somehow related to some flow of information between nodes in the subset.
We can then define a connected cut-set for g as a cut-set which is internally connected in g.
Consistently, we can redefine a measure of cohesiveness based on minimal connected cut-sets
(see Sects. 3.3 and 3.4 for applications of these concepts).
2.2.2 Clustering
Within a network, two neighbours of a given node may or may not be themselves neighbours.
When they are, they “close” the triangle of relationships by forming a “cluster”. The degree
of clustering may vary greatly across networks, depending on the nature of the relations
described by links. In a hierarchical organization, for instance, clustering is very low, while
in friendships clustering tend to be quite high, since common friends often become friends
themselves. A measure of how clustered a network is looks at all the potential triangles in the
networks (a node with two neighbours) and counts the fraction of times that such triangles are
actually closed; a slightly different measure takes this fraction for each node in the network,
and then averages across all nodes.
2.2.3 Modularity
Modularity measures quantify the extent to which the network is partitioned into separate sub-
groups of nodes, which should be considered as “communities” with little inter-connections
and dense intra-connections. These measures (see Scott 2000, pp. 126–145, for a discussion)
involve procedures of hierarchical clustering. The degree of network modularity is important,
for instance, for the consequences, in terms of aggregate diffusion, of shocks that affect a
single community of nodes, or individual nodes. As Golub and Jackson (2012) have shown,
homophily and assortative matching, by inducing strong modularity in social ties, can slow
down the process of diffusion of information within the network. Hence, local differences
tend to persist and society fails to converge to a uniform set of beliefs.
2.2.4 Centrality
Nodes in a network may have different degrees of “importance” in connecting other nodes.
For instance, a node may be critical in the sense that by removing it from the network, the
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other nodes would split into two or more components. Or a node may be important because
many of the shortest paths that connect the other nodes pass through that single node. Or,
still, because it is very close to all other nodes in the network, or to the most important nodes
in the network.
Centrality indices have the scope of formally quantifying the importance of nodes in the
network. A first basic way to think of centrality is to simply consider how many connections a
node has – that is, taking a node’s degree (possibly normalized by the total number of nodes if
one wishes to compare centrality in different networks). Other notions of centrality make use
of more global information about the position of nodes in the network. Closeness centrality
measures how close a node is to all other nodes in the network, and is given by the inverse
of the sum of a node’s distances from all other nodes. Betweeness centrality measures how
important a node is in efficiently connecting other nodes in the network; for a given node i
this index is given by the fraction of shortest paths between any two nodes k and j that go
through node i . Eigenvalue centrality accounts for the type of connections that a node has in
the network; it is based on the (recursive) idea that central nodes are those connected to other
central nodes. Finally, Bonacich centrality counts all walks that depart from a given node in
the network, discounting longer walks by an exponential factor.
Recent work on strategic behaviour in networks has shown that centrality correlates with
agents’ behaviour when actions exert local peer effects (see Ballester et al. 2006). This is due
to the large exposure of central agents to the positive feedbacks coming from peer effects.
When actions also generate local negative externalities in the form, for instance, of passive
smoke or transboundary pollution, the relation between centrality and behaviour becomes
more complex, and more intense behaviour can move towards the periphery of the network
(see Currarini et al. 2014 and, for empirical evidence on smoking, Christakis and Fowler
2002).
2.2.5 Degree Distributions
While centrality describes features of single nodes as a function of the whole network, other
measures aim at capturing features of the overall distribution of links in the network. The
degree distribution of a network provides information about the fraction of nodes that have
any given degree in the network. Mathematically, it associates each possible degree d (from
0 to n − 1, where n is the total number of nodes) with the fraction of nodes with degree d
in the network under consideration. It must be noted that although the degree distribution
provides useful information on how evenly distributed connections are in a network (whether,
for instance, the network has a considerable fraction of nodes that act as hubs and of nodes
that are poorly connected or, alternatively, all nodes have more or less the same degree), this
measure is silent about other characteristics such as clustering. Figure 2 gives an example of
two networks with the same degree distribution (degenerate, with all agents having degree
of 2), but quite different architectures in terms of connectivity and clustering.
A benchmark degree distribution is the Poisson distribution, which approximates the
expected degree distribution in a purely random network where each link forms with the
same given exogenous probability. The fraction of nodes with degree d under the Poisson
distribution is P (d) = μd e−μd! . Real world networks tend to violate independence and
uniform randomness in the formation of links, and often exhibit scale free (or power law)
distributions, characterized by fatter lower and upper tails compared to the Poisson. Under
a scale free distribution, the fraction of agents with degree d is given by P (d) = cd−γ (see
Fig. 3). The parameter c shifts the expected degree of the distribution, while the parameter
γ affects the curvature (smaller values generate fatter tails). As it can be easily checked, the
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Fig. 2 Clustering and degree
distributions
(i) (ii) 
Fig. 3 Poisson and scale free distributions for a network with 60 nodes and average degree of 24. Parameters
are c = 24.4, γ = 3, μ = 24. A detailed picture of the upper tails is provided
relative frequency of two different degrees is invariant to the multiplication of both degrees
by a common factor (or scale), from which the term “scale free”. Such fat tails are generated
in models of growing random network where more connected nodes face better chances to
form further links with newly born nodes (as in the preferential attachment model by Barabasi
1999).
2.3 Welfare, Behaviour and Network Formation
2.3.1 Network Games, Allocation Rules and Efficient Networks
The patterns of social interaction are likely to affect agents’ behaviour, aggregate welfare and
welfare distribution. The traditional models of game theory, in which every agent typically
interacts with everyone else, have been extended to encompass the structure of local interac-
tions described by the network. In particular, in graphical games, agents are assumed to only
interact with their neighbours in the network, whose actions directly enter their payoff func-
tion. However, equilibrium feedbacks are present also between agents who are only indirectly
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connected in the network, and each agent’s equilibrium behaviour ends up depending on the
entire architecture rather than only on her neighbourhood. Two broad classes of graphical
games are: (i) games with strategic complements, where an agent’s incentives to act increase
with the number (or the share) of neighbours taking the action; (ii) games with strategic
substitutes, where incentives to act decrease with the number (or share) of neighbours taking
the action. Strategic complements well describe settings where conformism, imitation or
other economic mechanisms correlate agents’ behaviour with their neighbours’; substitutes
represent problems where incentives to free ride are present, and agents substitute their own
(costly) action with their neighbours’.
In large networks, agents may have limited knowledge of the overall architecture beyond
their neighbour-hood. The class of network games, studied in Galeotti et al. (2010), captures
this incomplete information aspect by assuming that only the overall degree distribution of
the network is common knowledge, and each agent privately knows her own degree, and for-
mulates expectations about her neighbours’ degrees and behaviour. Within this framework,
it is possible to draw sharp conclusions about the implications of changes in the network’s
topology on agents’ behaviour in the classes of games with strategic complements and sub-
stitutes.
Using a reduced form approach in line with the cooperative games tradition, we can
associate with each network g a value function v expressing the total welfare generated by
agents in the network. The real number v (g) can be thought as the sum of agents payoffs in
a game played on g, or as the social “pie” that is generated in g and that must be distributed
among agents. Individual payoffs are represented by an allocation rule a (v, g), a vector-
valued function mapping each economic problem (a pair v, g) into a distribution of the value
v (g). A network g∗ is said to be efficient with respect to v if it maximizes the size of the pie
to be distributed: g∗ = argmaxgv (g).
2.3.2 Link Formation, Stability and Efficiency
The way in which the allocation rule a (v, g) distributes the total pie among agents determines
agents’ incentives to form and sever links. For instance, agent i (node i) in network g will
have an incentive to form the link i j /∈ g if her payoff, as determined by the rule a (v, g),
would increase in g + i j compared to g. Any notion of stability of a network refers to such
incentives, and is therefore defined with respect to the pair (v, a). Depending on agents’
strategic possibilities to revise their links we obtain various notions of stability.
One first important issue is whether agents can form links without the consent of their per-
spective partners. This modelling choice clearly depends on the specific economic problem
one has in mind, and in particular on whether links are directed or undirected. If links repre-
sent literature citations or Internet page referrals, unilateral link formation is an appropriate
assumption. Mutual consent is instead required in international environmental agreements,
information sharing, friendships, insurance, market agreements, co-authorship, and in many
other socio-economic applications.
A second issue is the extent to which agents are able to coordinate their decision to revise
links. When links can be formed unilaterally, stability can be defined by directly applying
the Nash equilibrium to a suitably defined link formation game. Coordination is instead a
crucial issue when mutual consent is required to form a link, since individual actions are not
capable of adding links to a network. The notion of pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky
1996) assumes that agents can coordinate to form a profitable link: a stable network obtains
when no pair of agents wishes to form a new link, and no agent wishes to (unilaterally) sever
an existing link. Note that pairwise stability cannot be derived as the Nash equilibrium of a
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suitably defined link formation game, since: (i) agents can only sever one of their existing
links, and (ii) pairs of agents can jointly deviate from a network by forming a new link. The
notion of Nash-pairwise stability, allowing both the coordinated objection of pairs of agents
and the severance of any number of an agent’s own connections, is instead a refinement of the
Nash equilibrium. The even more demanding notion of strong stability (Jackson and van den
Nouweland 2005), assumes that any subset of agents can coordinate in the joint revision of
their links, and possesses similar features to the strong Nash equilibrium of games in strategic
form.
Since an agent’s decisions to add or sever links potentially affect all other agents in the
network (the so called network externalities), decentralized linking decisions are likely to
lead to inefficient networks from a social point of view. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) have
shown that network formation suffers indeed from a general tension between stability and
efficiency. They show that no allocation rule a (v, g) that satisfies natural symmetry and
anonymity properties guarantees that the efficient network will be pairwise stable. Given the
limited amount of coordination required by the pairwise stability notion, this result highlights
a serious inconsistency between private and social incentives in network formation. Other
contributions have proposed ways to overcome this tension, focusing on either mechanism
design approaches (Dutta and Mutuswami 1997), or on Coase-like bargaining procedures
(Currarini and Morelli 2000), or still on general transfers schemes (Bloch and Jackson 2007).
When spillovers are present across components (a relevant case for environmental problems,
where agents benefit and suffer from actions taken by other disconnected agents), efficiency
generally requires the use of contingent transfers, which subsidize the formation or the
deletion of those links that are responsible for the spillovers (see Bloch and Jackson 2007).
3 Mapping the Linkages Between Network Economics
and the Environment
3.1 Diffusion and Evolution in Networks
Many aspects of environmental economics and resource management problems are intrin-
sically dynamic. For example, natural resources are often stocks whose laws of motion are
affected by both natural factors and human behaviours. The opinions, beliefs and incentives
that determine environmental behaviours tend to evolve in time, and to spread through society
according to dynamics that depend on the patterns of social connections.
In this chapter we discuss the role of networks in our understanding of such dynamics, and
provide a specific example of how networks have fruitfully enriched models of environmental
behaviour. Although we treat “diffusion” and “evolution” separately, these phenomena are
strictly related, and models are often formally equivalent.
3.1.1 Diffusion of Green Technologies
Diffusion is defined by Rogers (1995) as “the process by which an innovation is communicated
through certain channels over time among the members of a social system”. The key terms
in this definition are the novelty of the piece of information to be transmitted, and the role of
social channels for this spread. Beliefs, infections, fashions and various kinds of behaviors
spread through society in very much the same way as information does. Understanding the
diffusion process is a central issue in environmental sciences to the extent that what spreads
in society has a potential effect on natural resources and their management. This is the case,
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Fig. 4 An example of S-shaped diffusion curve
for instance, for the adoption of innovative technologies by firms (Conley and Udry 2001),
of green behaviour by consumers, as well as cooperative behaviour by signatories of an
international environmental agreement (Heal and Kunreuther 2012).
The early models on diffusion (see Bass 1969) neglect the local nature of interaction,
and focus on the overall “rate of adoption” in society, whose dynamics are governed by the
overall ratio of adopters and of non adopters at any point in time. The key insight from the
Bass model is that diffusion follows a nonlinear trend, with first a fast acceleration and a
subsequent slowdown (Fig. 4, Young 2009).
Although the Bass model contains no “micro-foundation” for the dynamics of the rate of
adoption, similar nonlinear patterns of diffusion are obtained in models where agents opti-
mally decide whether to adopt as a function of how many adopters are present in societies.
Such models are built on the idea of strategic complementarities, where the incentives to
adopt increase with the fraction of other agents adopting the innovation. Depending on the
context, many definitions have been given to the idea that other people’s actions can rein-
force one’s own choices: ‘bandwagon effects’ in fashion-oriented behaviour (Leibenstein
1950), individuals’ adoption thresholds (Granovetter 1978), entrapment (Dixit 2003), net-
work externalities, social reinforcement, cascades (Watts 2002), tipping (Gladwell 2000) and
“positive feedback trading” in finance (Barberis and Shleifer 2003), among others. Empirical
work relating to environmental problems has established the relevance of the S-shaped curve
for the diffusion and adoption of new technologies. Ryan and Gross (1943) and Griliches
(1957) demonstrated that the adoption of hybrid corn seeds among Iowa farmers follow the
pattern presented in Fig. 4. More recently, Weir and Knight (2004) find a significant role of
schooling, mediated by social networks, in the adoption and diffusion of innovations using
data from Ethiopia. Specifically, they suggest that literate farmers are early adopters of new
farming practices as well as quick at imitating innovations by others, while illiterate farmers
tend to be second-movers and eventually adopt the practices of the innovators.
The role of complementarities for diffusion is also central to works that study the presence
of tipping point for the adoption of climate policies by the international community. Heal and
Kunreuther (2012) offer illustrative evidence on the role of early adopters (i.e. those located at
the left x-axis corner in Fig. 4) in triggering a global shift from damaging pollutants’ usage to
greener alternatives. The first one concerns the adoption of unleaded gasoline in replacement
of leaded gasoline; here the unilateral adoption by the United States meant that the subsequent
adoption’s costs for other countries was confined to modifying refinery capacity, since motor
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industries exporting to the U.S. had to transition to lead-free fuel immediately after the
move. Thanks to these reduced costs for the followers, the new technology spread quickly
worldwide. Another example refers to phasing out chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), a spectacular
achievement of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.1 In this
case, the U.S. decision to sign the Montreal Protocol hinged on a technological innovation by
Du Pont, the world’s largest producer of CFCs, allowing the company to gain from elimination
of CFCs. Again, strategic complementary led most countries to phase-out ozone-depleting
chemicals.
While absent from these early models of diffusion, the role of social contacts (the “chan-
nels” in Rogers 1995’s definition) in determining the final outcome of diffusion is little
disputable. For instance, the probability that a substantial fraction of the population will get
infected by a virus, initially affecting only a small subset of agents, will largely depend on
how densely connected the network is, on the shape of the degree distribution, and on how
these features relate to the specifics of the infection (how aggressive and contagious it is,
how costly immunizing part of society is, etc…). Similarly, a farmer’s incentive to adopt a
new technology will depend on how many of his neighbors have adopted it, and probably on
how profitable the adoption turned out to be.
The theoretical effort devoted to the extension of the basic aggregate models of diffusion to
encompass the role of networks has produced a vast and growing literature. This literature tries
to address issues such as the effect of different network topologies on the speed of diffusion,
the role of mediators and perpetrators, the effect of assortative matching (homophily) on the
spread of information, the role of the costs of diffusion.
In the epidemiology literature, the two main benchmarks are the SIR (Susceptible,
Infected, Recovered) and the SIS (Susceptible, Infected, Susceptible) models of diffusion. In
the SIS model, agents are born healthy (susceptible), get infected with some probability and
with some probability recover, after which they become susceptible of infection again. Here
the network topology affects the probability that an agent gets infected; this is proportional
to its degree and to the probability that one of his neighbours is infected (and also to the rate
of disease transmission, measuring how infectious the disease is but not depending on the
network structure). Both the speed of convergence to steady state with non-zero infection and
the overall social extent of the infection depend on the degree distribution of the network,
and on how this topology relates to the rate of transmission (see Jackson 2008).
Examining the effect of changes in the degree distribution provides an instructive example
of what one can learn by explicitly modelling the network. First, a first order stochastic
dominance shift in the degree distribution (larger average degree) always increases the speed
of diffusion and the steady state share of infected agents. This result has a very natural
intuition: more connections result in more intense social interaction and in a faster spread of
the disease. Second, a shift of the second order stochastic dominance type (larger fractions
of agents with very small and with very large degrees) has ambiguous effects: while a higher
fraction of poorly connected agents should slow down diffusion, a larger fraction of very well
connected agents should speed it up. The net effect depends on the topology of the network,
and on how this topology combines with the degree of infectiousness of the disease. When
infection rates are very high overall, a spread of the degree distribution results in a decrease
in diffusion, and vice versa. An intuition for this result comes from the non-linear relation
between a node’s degree and its probability of infection: already high infection rates are little
sensitive to increases in a node’s degree, simply because infection rates are bounded above.
1 As of September 2013, 197 countries have ratified the Protocol, banning the production of chlorofluoro-
carbons, halons, and other ozone-depleting chemicals.
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So, when infection rates are high, the effect of increasing the number of very connected nodes
is small and dominated by the effect of increasing the number of little connected nodes. By a
specular arguments, when the infection is little aggressive a spread in the degree distribution
increases the speed of diffusion, as the effect of more nodes with large degree dominates the
effect of more nodes with very small degree.
Interestingly, similar insights characterize problems with strategic complementarities,
where the probability of taking an action increases with the share (or number) of neighbours
taking that same action. Here as well more connections imply faster diffusion, and the effect
of a mean preserving spread in the degree distribution is ambiguous. Faster diffusion occurs
when the incentives to adopt are very sensitive to the degree of an agent—a similar condition
to the one for the SIS model, where the rate of transmission had to be very sensitive to the
degree. A notable difference with respect to the SIS model is that conditions for large scale
spread apply to the size of the initial adopters, which has to exceed a given threshold in order
for diffusion to kick off (an intuitive consequence of complementarities).
3.1.2 Evolution of Cooperation in Networks
Cooperative behaviour and social dilemmas are of great importance in environmental eco-
nomics. The stylized and tractable framework of the Prisoner’s Dilemma has spurred an
immense literature trying to assess the potential of socio-economic systems to overcome the
inefficiencies of private incentives.2 In environmental problems, this relates to the ability of
a system to preserve exhaustible natural resources, manage commons and produce public
goods. Since cooperative behaviour (especially within groups) seems to be at the root of
successful evolution, despite the fact that co-operators are themselves, as individuals, under
evolutionary pressures, the emergence of cooperation has traditionally been of interest to
evolutionary biologists. Evolutionary models have then been established as the standard par-
adigm to study cooperation. A fundamental question in this body of research is under what
conditions cooperation would prevail as a product of evolutionary dynamics. A useful starting
point is the early result showing that when social interaction is unstructured (the so-called
well-mixed matching model, where every agent may interact with every other agent), natural
selection increases the relative abundance of defectors and drives cooperators to extinction
(see, for instance, Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998; Nowak et al. 2004). Cooperation is therefore
unviable in the long run.
Researchers have then focused on various mechanisms that may generate either partial or
widespread long run cooperation. One of such mechanism is of direct interest to the present
survey, as it focuses on the role of local (or “spatial” or “targeted”) interaction.3 The general
idea is that agents do not observe, or interact with, all other agents in the system, but only with
a restricted set of neighbours. In this framework, local interaction determines both individual
payoffs (via the game being played locally) and the (myopic) payoff comparisons that drive
the revision mechanism. The main finding of this literature is that within such structured
populations (described by an incomplete network), the outcome of evolutionary games can
be very different from the one of the well-mixed case. The early work of Nowak and May
(1992) shows that when local interaction takes the form of a two dimensional lattice, chaotic
dynamics may persist in the long run, with both cooperators and defectors present in non
vanishing portion of society. In general, the possibility that cooperation occurs in the long
2 Other social games that have been studied in the evolutionary literature are the “stage-hunt” and the
“snowdrift” games, where dominant strategies are absent and dynamics select one out of multiple equilibria.
3 These also include direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, kin selection and multi-level selection.
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run has been shown to depend on depend on whether the benefit-to-cost ratio of cooperation
exceeds the average number of interactions (Ohtsuki et al. 2006). Moreover, “diversity” in
the degree distribution has been shown to help promote cooperation. In particular, various
studies confirm that scale free distributions (i.e., networks in which very connected and very
little connected agents abound compared to uniform random assortment) are able to sustain
partial cooperation in the long run, independently of the underlying game being played4
(Alonso-Sanz 2009; Santos and Pacheco 2005; Santos et al. 2006, 2012; Rand et al. 2014).
A very recent and insightful line of research is now looking at the effects of the co-
evolution of behaviour and interaction structures. In fact, it seems reasonable to assume that
not only behaviour is affected by the structure of social contacts, but also that this structure
may change in response to experienced behaviour. Agents may in fact try to form or sever
links in order to take advantage of more profitable partners, or to mimic the social contacts of
successful neighbours, or just because their preferences may change due to past interactions.
Early attempts to study the coevolution of network and behaviour have simply assumed that
the network itself evolves according to its own evolutionary dynamics. This approach is found
also in more recent papers (see, for instance, Ebel and Bornholdt 2002a; Szolnoki and Perc
2009c).
A richer approach fully encompasses the feedback between behaviour and social structure,
and allows the network dynamics to depend on past strategies (see Ebel and Bornholdt 2002b;
Chen et al. 2008; Gräser et al. 2009). Skyrms and Pemantle (2000) first suggested how
considering the dynamic of the network, as it generates from agents’ linking decisions, can
have substantial effects on the evolution of cooperation compared to models with a fixed
network. Interestingly, a careful examination of these feedbacks has lead to results that are at
odds with previously shared wisdom on what type of social structure promotes cooperation.
In particular, Hanaki et al. (2007) have shown how the survival of a cooperating population
requires sparse networks, little local clustering, and the possibility that agents unilaterally
cut unprofitable ties. This findings are at odds with the prior wisdom that cooperation would
develope in closed and dense communities of cooperators (see Axelrod 1984; Coleman
1988). Similar insights underly the results by Santos et al. (2012), showing that structures
that promote cooperation, exhibiting enough diversity in the degree distribution, can arise by
means of agents’ voluntary link revision.
No work to our knowledge has studied the coevolution of the social structure, behavior and
agents’ preferences (such as, for instance, prejudice against diversity or social awareness).
This seems to be a promising direction of research in environmental economics, where
environmentally aware behavior by consumers tends to diffuse according to social relations,
and is also likely to shape (and be itself shaped) by the formation of new social ties.
3.1.3 Coevolution of Behavior and Natural Resources
We end this section with a specific example of what additional insights are obtained by mod-
elling network interaction in problems of diffusion of behaviour. In particular we consider
the evolution of cooperative behaviour in resource harvesting. Tavoni et al. (2012) and Lade
et al. (2013) explored the effectiveness of social sanctioning of resource overuse in promot-
ing sustainable extraction. Two types of agents, norm-following co-operators (C) limiting
their resource use to the socially optimal amount, and defectors (D) who extract above the
4 The two main metaphors for the tension between private and collective incentives are the Prisoners’ Dilemma
(in which defecting is a dominant strategy) and the Snowdrift Game (also known as “Chicken Game”, in which
cooperation is a best response to defection and viceversa). For the Snowdrift Game, Hauert and Doebeli (2004)
have shown that local interaction may inhibit co-operation rather than promoting it.
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Fig. 5 Co-existence of co-operators and defectors in a well-mixed population (thick solid curve) and in regular
networks with decreasing average degree. μ ∈ (1, 3.5) is the degree of defection relative to C, and fc is the
frequency of C-types. Source Chung et al. (2013)
sustainable level, interact in a well-mixed population (i.e. absent a network structure). Either
type, when randomly matched with a fellow user of the shared resource, updates his or her
strategy based on utility differences, according to the replicator dynamics. A key feature
of this model is the explicit consideration of resource dynamics, which are coupled with
behavioural dynamics. Payoffs from harvesting vary depending on the composition of the
population: the higher the share of defectors, the more depleted the resource and the less
effective the sanctions. The results of this a-spatial model, where everyone interacts with
everyone else, are displayed in Fig. 5 for varying degrees of the parameter μ, which captures
the extent of norm violation.5 Three regimes of stationary state of the evolutionary dynamics
obtain: (i) the defector equilibrium (when the dynamics tend to the left of the figure); (ii) the
co-operator equilibrium (on the right hand side of the figure); and (iii) the mixed equilibrium
where both C and D coexist.
Chung et al. (2013) have enriched this model with an explicit account of the structure of
local interactions, formalized by a social network. The thinner lines in Fig. 5 show results for
a model where individuals only observe agents in their neighbourhood. Here, the effect of the
sanctions imposed on a norm violator is assumed to depend exclusively on the fraction of co-
operators in the defector’s neighbourhood.6 The figure refers to regular connected networks
of 50 nodes, with degrees of k = 40 (solid curve), k = 20 (dashed curve), k = 10 (dotted
curve) and k = 2 (dash-dotted curve). We observe that as the common degree declines, the
basin of attraction of the co-operator equilibrium shrinks, paving the way for a ‘tragedy of
the commons’.
Interestingly, the joint account of behaviour and resource dynamics generates predictions
that are somewhat at odds with those obtained in models where resource dynamics are absent.
While in such models long run cooperation requires sparse networks and low clustering or,
at least, the presence of many little connected agents (see the previous section for a discus-
5 The arrows in the figure indicate the direction in which the composition of the population evolves, so that
one can determine which equilibrium obtains for a given initial share of co-operators (and the level of defection
by norm-violators).
6 This is in contrast to the well-mixed population, where all defectors are subject to the same amount of
ostracism.
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sion), here stable long run cooperation is consistent only with highly connected networks.
Further research should qualify such predictions for non-regular networks, such as scale-free
networks, where cooperation has been shown to be consistent with long run evolutionary
selection.
3.2 Access and Use of Natural Resources
The access and distribution of natural resources often entails the use of networked infrastruc-
tures and markets. This is the case, for instance, of irrigation water and natural gas. In these
examples, the cost and benefits from the use of the resource is determined by the pattern of
canals and pipelines through which this is sourced and distributed. The efficient use of the
resource calls for agreements and contracts between the nodes of the network, whose gains
and benefits are determined through complex bargaining processes. The network itself is, to
some extent, flexible, as new links can be created and existing links destroyed in pursue of
larger profits. The incentives to form or delete a link may well not align with social incentives,
as the formation only requires the consent of the two interested nodes, and the deletion often
only requires the consent of one of the interested nodes. Due to network externalities, inef-
ficient networks may result from the decentralized formation of links, and a general tension
between efficiency and stability has been recognized in early works of network economics
(see Jackson and Wolinsky 1996). Two issues seem to be of prominent interest for the appli-
cation of network economics to natural resources: how players will share the gains from
cooperation through bargaining, and how this will affect, and be affected, by the degree of
flexibility of the network and the incentives to form and delete links.
In this section we discuss these issues using, as an illustrative example, the case of the
Eurasian natural gas pipelines. Eurasian gas accounts for 40% of EU gas imports, and most
of these imports transit through Belarus or Ukraine, both importing gas from the Russian
Federation.
A striking example of the stark consequences of failures in the bargaining process is
provided by the 2009 crisis, where the disagreement on gas prices and fees led to interruptions
Fig. 6 Eurasian pipeline gas network. Source Hubert and Cobanli
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of supply through Ukraine for several weeks (see Hubert and Cobanli 2012, Fig. 6). Such
retaliatory behaviour can be viewed as an attempt to build-up bargaining power out of strategic
and vital positions in the transmission network. In general, players’ bargaining power (and,
with it, their final payoff) will depend on their position in the pipeline network, together
with other factors such as market size, production capacity and international power. Recent
contributions in network theory have provided a framework to study bargaining processes
among agents located on a network. These are mainly buyer-seller networks, in which a
player bargaining power depends, in a complex manner, on her connections to other nodes
on other side of the market, and on the connections of these nodes. However, distribution
networks generally have a more complex structure than buyer-seller networks. Specifically,
they are characterized by directed links and present strong heterogeneities among players;
incorporating these features within a fully-fledged non cooperative bargaining model is a
challenging, yet necessary task for future research.
Adopting an alternative approach, based on cooperative game theory, Hubert and Cobanli
(2012) have studied the specific problem of Eurasian gas pipelines network. This approach
relies on a variation of the Shapely Value for games with a communication structure, that is,
games where agents’ cooperation possibilities are described by a network. This variant, first
proposed by Myerson (1977), is based on a description of coalitional values that take into
account the limits to cooperation imposed by the fixed network structure. Using the notation
developed in Sect. 2, we let g|S be the sub-network obtained by only considering nodes in S
and those links for which at least one of the involved nodes belongs to S. Let also C (g|S)
be the set of components of g|S , and let π (g|S) be the partition obtained by considering the
set of nodes of the components in C (g|S). Given a primitive characteristic function v (S)
describing the payoff possibilities of each coalition S, we can define the new value function
vg = ∑B∈π(g|S) v (B). This function captures the fact that players without links in g are not
able to coordinate their actions unless indirectly connected by other players who transmit
the necessary information. So, the coalition S is only able to generate a value equal to the
sum of values generated by its connected components. The marginal contributions that enter
the computation of the Shapley value are, of course, affected by the network. In particular,
players who are vital for many connected components, end up having very large marginal
contributions and, therefore, a large Shapley value. This, in turn, implies that players who
act as connectors in the network will be allocated a relatively large share of the aggregate
payoff. Within the context of the Eurasia pipeline network, the resulting allocation rule is
such that those countries that, if removed from the network, would impede the flow of gas
from sources to users, such as Belarus and Ukraine, have a strong bargaining power.
The outlined relation between the network architecture and players’ bargaining power can
help interpret recent developments in the (planned) infrastructures of gas distribution. These
include: (i) the offshore twin-pipeline Nord Stream, which establishes a direct link between
Russia and Germany through the Baltic Sea; (ii) the South Stream pipeline, providing a direct
connection between Russia and Bulgaria, from where gas should flow to Central Europe,
Italy and Turkey; and (iii) the Nabucco project which should open a corridor through Turkey,
thus connecting Europe to new suppliers in the Middle East and the Caspian region. If
implemented, these projects would considerably weaken the bargaining position of Belarus
and Ukraine, reshaping the power along the network at the advantage of Russia and Europe. In
terms of network economics, the very fact that these projects are being planned or undertaken
suggest that the current configuration of pipelines does not constitute a “pairwise stable”
network architecture (see Jackson and Wolinsky 1996). This notion of stability would in fact
require that no pair of nodes has an incentive to bear the cost of a new link, and that no
node find it profitable to cut any of its links. As in the case of the newly planned pipelines,
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such incentives are determined by the expectation of a new payoff allocation following the
creation or deletion of a link. This makes clear that a better understanding of the economics
and strategy of networked resources would call for an analysis of network formation, itself
based on a careful assessment of incentives to form and sever links, of the associated costs
and gains in bargaining power, and of the consequences for the system as a whole. This seems
to be a challenging and exciting area for future research.
3.3 Common-pool Resource Management and Governance
The collective management of natural resources is increasingly being recognised as a critical
dimension of sustainable development and a key determinant of economic performance,
especially in the rural sector of developing economies (Platteau 1991; Baland and Platteau
1996; Ostrom 2003; Ballester et al. 2006; Baland et al. 2006). By its nature, collective action
involves interdependency among individuals. For example, the maintenance of an irrigation
network requires the stabilization of the rims and the desalting of minor channels across
farmers’ land. Interdependency, combined with the non-excludable and rival nature of many
natural resources, poses significant challenges and raises the question of whether individuals
are capable to coordinate their action and successfully manage resources held in common.
The conventional theory of collective action—centred on the powerful metaphor of the
tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968), the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, and the free-riding
problem (Olson 1965)—offered a pessimistic yet influential answer to this question, that
has for long dominated the way in which social scientists thought about shared resources
(Ostrom et al. 1999). Over the past decades, however, scholars from different disciplines and
backgrounds have shown that the tragedy of the commons is not inevitable, and individuals
have the potentials to act collectively.7 The recognition that collective action is possible has, in
turn, shifted the attention of more recent research towards the question of why collective action
emerges and under which conditions it is more likely to succeed or fail. Within this context, a
number of structural variables have been identified as critical for the successful management
of common-pool resources. These include institutional arrangements concerning monitoring,
sanctions and accountability; group characteristics related to size, levels of wealth, and social
capital; attributes of the social environment and of the resource system, such as the social
cohesion and the networked structure of groups, well-defined boundaries, unpredictability
of resource flows, and resource mobility.
While the first two sets of variables—i.e. institutional arrangements and group
characteristics—have been studied extensively both theoretically and empirically, our under-
standing of factors related to resource characteristics and the role of social networks is still
relatively limited. Yet the physical complexity of natural resources may have important impli-
cations for whether and how users can sustain effective institutions. For example, as water
moves through a landscape, hydrological attributes such as quantity, quality, location and
timing, are likely to be influenced by land use and vegetation patterns. The interconnected
nature of the hydrological cycle, thus, implies that many actors and sectors influence water
resources at different geographic scales and administrative levels of governance.
In this section we will discuss recent contributions and possible advances in two of the
above aspects of the management of common resources, both calling for a network perspec-
tive: multiple commons and multi-level governance in the water sector.
7 Examples of cooperative behaviour have been identified in a wide range of contexts. These include the
management of fisheries (e.g., Acheson 2003; Singleton 1999), forests (e.g., McKean 1986, 2000; Schoon-
maker Freudnberger 1993), pastures (e.g., Gilles et al. 1992; Netting 1981; Nugent and Sanchez 1999), and
groundwater resources (e.g., Trawick 2003; Marchiori et al. 2012).
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Fig. 7 Two different networks of
two cities and two sources
ssssources
3.3.1 Networks of Commons
Most models of commons assume that there exists a single source exploited by many users. In
fact, the most representative commons (e.g. forests, pastures, and groundwater resources) are
local, but numerous. The multiplicity of sources can raise interesting political and economic
questions. For example, the severe drought that affected Spain in 2006-2007 led the govern-
ment to consider the possibility of transferring water from the north to the south through the
construction of new pipelines. This proposal gave rise to a political debate about regional
and national sovereignty over water resources, and the potential economic and environmental
consequences of water transfers.
A first important step towards the analysis of common-pool resource problems with multi-
ple sources was recently made by Ilkiliç (2011). In this paper, the author considers a situation
in which n (water) sources s1, s2, . . . , sn and m cities c1, c2, . . . , cm are embedded in a net-
work that links cities with sources. Figure 7 provides two examples of possible network
structures in the case of two cities and two sources. The first graph, describes a complete net-
work where each user is linked with both sources, while in the second graph, c2 is connected
only to s2.
The cities receive a value from consumption of the resource, but extraction is costly. Water
consumption has linear benefits; extraction costs are convex, and are composed of a private
part, which depends quadratically on total extraction by the city, and of a part that is source
specific and is subject to a congestion effect. Specifically, city j’s utility takes the following
form:
u j
(
Qg
) = q j −
q2j
2
−
∑
si ∈Ng(c j)
qi j qi .
where qi j is the amount of water extracted by city c j from source si , q j is the total amount
extracted by c j , and qi is the total amount extracted from source si . So, a city’s extraction
from a given source has a negative cost externality on all other users of that same source.
There is therefore no physical externality across sources. In particular, this implies that a
model with two sources is different from a model with one source even when all cities are
linked to both sources.
Two important issues in this setting concern the non-cooperative extraction levels when
users freely decide how much to extract from each source they are connected to, and how these
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levels compare to the socially efficient use of the sources. A first main contribution of the paper
is that each city’s non-cooperative exploitation of a given source turns out to be proportional
to a measure of Bonacich centrality of the link connecting the city to that source.8 Consider,
for instance, the two cities-two sources case of figure 7. It can be shown that, if the network
structure is as in graph g1, the link flows at equilibrium are q∗11 = q∗21 = q∗12 = q∗22 = 0.2.
These levels equate marginal costs across sources for both cities, given the negative cost
externality associated with local extraction. Interestingly, these are equivalent to the levels
of extraction that would occur if each city was linked to a different source only. So, in the
complete network agents avoid the cost inefficiencies by sorting their extraction between the
two sources. If the network is incomplete as in g2, equilibrium extraction levels at equilibrium
are q∗11 = 0.2857, q∗21 = 0.1429, and q∗22 = 0.2857. In this case, c2 – which is now connected
only to s2—exploits this source more than in the complete network. This, in turn, makes the
extractions from s2 more costly, leading c1 to consume less water from this source and rely
relatively more on its exclusive connection s1. Hence the absent link between c2 and s1 harms
c2 (which is lacking the link) and benefits c1 (the city that is connected to both sources).
More generally (and interestingly), in a common-pool resource game with multiple
sources, a user’s extraction at a source does not only depend on the number of users it
shares it with. It also depends on the number of sources that these other users are linked
to; and on the number of users those sources are linked to, and so on. That is, the exter-
nality spreads through the network and across sources, despite the absence of any physical
interdependence across sources.
From a policy perspective, the analysis suggests that disregarding the structure of the
network may be misleading, because different structures affect both overall extraction levels
and the distribution of the resource across users and sources. Going back to the previous
example, the complete network g1 leads to relatively higher overall water consumption.
However, the incomplete structure g2 is such that s2 is exploited more severely. This, in
turn, may have implications for both the urgency and type of intervention depending on how
close to the point of non-recovery is the resource as a whole, and on the ecological and
socio-economic importance of different sources within the network.
Turning now to the efficient use of the various sources, the paper first shows that all
efficient allocations are characterized by the same aggregate extractions source by source
and city by city. More importantly, it turns out that the efficient use of water in a given
network is equivalent to the efficient use that would result by partitioning cities and sources
into independent “regions”. Each region would comprise a subset of cities together with the
sources to which these cities have access in the network, and within each region the aggregate
water use from each source would be the same as if the region was internally fully connected.
This conclusion seems to support a management approach based on the creation of distinct
and independent areas of water exploitation, where subsets of cities have exclusive access to
a subset of sources.
The paper opens the way to salient and challenging questions concerning the use of net-
worked resources. First, linking cities to sources may be a (costly) policy decision. The crucial
question is therefore which networks are socially efficient in this case, and whether agents
would indeed form the efficient links in a decentralized link formation game. Efficiency is
a property of link formation in the two sided problem studied by Kranton and Minehart
(2001), and it would be interesting to see whether those results apply to problems with local
8 Note that while in the traditional model of games on networks, where each node is a player, equilibrium
behaviour relates to the Bonacich centrality of nodes (see Ballester et al. 2006), here the equilibrium relates
to the Bonacich centrality of links. This is due to the fact that the city-to-source network is bipartite and only
the nodes in one of the two independent sets (the cities) are strategic players.
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congestion. Second, many real life instances where multiple commons are relevant present
spillovers across sources. We think, for instance of the complex interplay between ground-
water and surface water, but also of catchment areas in fisheries. Finally, cities and sources
may be heterogeneous, in costs and sizes, and this would naturally induce heterogeneous
extraction levels and efficient architectures.
3.3.2 Multi-level Governance in the Water Sector
The inherent complexity of water governance is due not only to the interconnectedness of the
hydrological cycle, but also to the multiplicity and variety of actors affecting water resources
at multiple levels. Responses to water problems are often based on top-down centralised
approaches, generally poorly suited to deal with the socio-political and ecological complex-
ities underpinning water use and management (Pretty and Ward 2001; Molle et al. 2007).
The emerging new frameworks for governing water see national governments increasingly
devolving decision-making responsibility to local authorities and encouraging stakeholders’
participation. The underlying rationale is that involving actors at different levels can lead to
improved accountability of stakeholders, higher legitimacy of the decisions, and management
strategies that are better adapted to local conditions (e.g. Marchiori et al. 2012).
Researchers in environmental policy distinguish between a ‘vertical’ and a ‘horizontal’
dimension of governance, where the former refers to the linkages between higher and lower
levels of government, including institutional, financial, and informational aspects; the lat-
ter refers to cooperative arrangements between a range of public and private actors in the
formulation and adoption of development strategies. Recent research has stressed how, by
shaping the functioning of such arrangements, social networks can either facilitate or hinder
the implementation of and the compliance with environmental regulations. Researchers have
argued that social ties of various kinds, ranging from information transmission channels to
power relations, social emulation, market interaction, kinship, funding, collaboration etc., can
be more important than formal decision making structures for the success of environmental
cooperation (see, for instance, Olsson et al. 2008).
In the specific case of water management, using a network approach to assess the effective-
ness of policies involves two steps: first, identifying all the actors that directly and indirectly
influence the complex process of water resource use; second, mapping their formal and infor-
mal relations. Direct influence means that an actor directly modifies water flows through
withdrawals and discharge activities, flow control measures and land use. Other actors may
exert an indirect influence by affecting the activities of those who use water directly. Think,
for example, of a governmental body that provides funding for the construction of a new
irrigation scheme.
To date, empirical research applying quantitative network analysis to natural resource
governance is still relatively limited. Yet, some valuable insights and hypotheses have started
to emerge in this evolving field. Three features of the networked social structure seem to
deserve special attention in future research: network density, network centrality and the co-
evolution of network and behaviour. We briefly discuss some of the insights coming from
existing studies and the potential role of network economics in advancing our understanding
of these issues. In fact, while the existing research has provided convincing arguments for the
importance of explicitly considering social networks in the study of natural resource man-
agement, a rigorous and careful analysis of the various trade-offs involved is still missing.
The “economics” approach, based on the construction of fully fledged behavioural models
together with explicit notions of equilibrium should prove useful in providing clear and the-
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oretically founded predictions of the role of the network topology for cooperative behaviour,
and of the evolution of the network itself.
Network Density The hypothesis that a more connected society would imply greater poten-
tial for collective action is supported by many studies in the natural resource governance
literature. Apart from the obvious observation that in order to cooperate on some issue some
type of social contact is needed, the general idea is that more connections should enhance
collaboration, ease monitoring and punishment, and help actors avoid conflicts and develop
effective management strategies (see, for instance, Olsson et al. 2004). In the context of rural
Kenya, King (2000) showed that fishermen communities characterised by a higher number
of interactions among themselves and with government officials were relatively better able to
deal with a series of unfavourable developments related to the fishery. Similar results emerge
from Conley and Udry (2001)’s analysis of agricultural practices in Ghana, where high net-
work density is associated with the development of new technologies and the diffusion of
more sustainable management practices. However, careful inspection of the processes that
govern behaviour on the network suggests that the intuitive but qualitative insight above may
fail. For instance, as shown in Currarini (2007) (see also Sect. 3.3 below), by increasing the
cohesiveness of the group, more connections may increase the outside option of potential
free-riders, undermining the possibilities of cooperation. Moreover, large density may hinder
co-operation by diffusing at a larger scale the information about the benefits of free riding,
preventing therefore the creation of co-operative clusters. This was shown in the context of
a model of evolutionary dynamics with myopic agents by Hanaki et al. (2007). Also, Bodin
and Norberg (2005) have shown how large density in a regular network may induce large
correlation in the strategy of myopic emulative agents, thereby increasing the odds of phase
transitions in which the natural resource is overexploited and possibly exhausted.
Network Cohesiveness and Clustering Higher density may often come along with more
cohesiveness and clustering. As we explained in Sect. 2, a cohesive network is one whose
connectedness is little vulnerable to departures of agents or coalitions of agents. In particular,
more cohesiveness means that it takes the departure of large coalitions to break up the network.
So defined, cohesiveness guarantees high free-riding incentives to small defecting groups
from a cooperating coalitions, who face large outside options due to the presence of positive
spillovers (see, again, Sect. 3.3). In this case, cohesivenss is detrimental to cooperation. By
the same spoken, cohesiveness lowers the incentives to defect when spillovers are negative,
and facing a united residual coalition is detrimental to defectors’ payoffs. It has also been
shown by Hanaki et al. (2007) that high clustering can hinder cooperation by limiting the
possibility that agents observe uncorrelated information. Since in their model agents learn
and imitate their neighbours, it is best to observe uncorrelated information, since correlated
information will often be biased in favour of the dominating strategy of “not cooperating” in
prisoner’s dilemma situations. This also implies that large networks, where the structure tends
to be sparse both locally and globally, are more favourable to cooperation than small ones
– another counter-intuitive conclusion. In order to better understand the role of clustering
and cohesiveness, one should refer to more complex models of learning, in which both the
imitation and the information acquisition functions of relational ties are at work. For instance,
the promoting role of assortative matching for cooperation (see Watts 1999, 2002) should
be contrasted with its averse effect on the speed of diffusion of information (see Golub and
Jackson 2012), possibly resulting in the localization of cooperation and innovation in small
and very cohesive groups.
Centrality While the notions of density and cohesiveness refer to the overall topology
of social ties, and affect—as we have seen—the overall evolution of cooperation, centrality
refers to the role of individual actors in the network. For example, by occupying certain
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central positions, some actors may be able to critically influence other relevant stakeholders,
thus favouring (or blocking) the development of sustainable management initiatives. Stein
et al. (2011) use the notions of degree centrality and betweenness centrality (see Sect. 2.1)
to identify key players in the complex social and institutional landscape underpinning water
governance in the Mkindo catchment, Tanzania. Within this context, the network of actors
that either directly or indirectly influence water flows is a diverse set of players, ranging from
local resource users and village leaders to higher-level governmental agencies, universities
and NGOs. Results show that village leaders play a brokerage role in the network connecting
water and land related activities within their respective village and, to some extent, across
villages. The organisations with a formal mandate for the management of water resources,
on the other hand, link across larger segments of the catchment, but are not well connected
to local communities.
In general, identifying the most influential agents in the process of natural resource man-
agement may be more challenging than one would expect, both empirically and theoretically.
Recently, Bonacich centrality has been shown to predict behaviour in the context of peer
effects (Ballester et al. 2006), but behaviour may instead prevail at the periphery of the
network when local negative externalities are present, as shown by Currarini et al. 2014.
Empirically, this has been recorded, for instance, for the case of smoking intensity, which has
been shown by Christakis and Fowler (2002) to be largest for agents far away from the core
of the network. Interestingly, Ballester et al. (2006) have shown that network based policies
aimed at reducing socially undesirable behaviour should target key-players who need not be
central in the network. Other variants of centrality have been recently shown by Banerjee
et al. (2013) to be relevant to identify which agents in a network would, if informed about
a financial innovation, have the highest impact on overall adoption in society. Their study
provides important insights on the differences between adoption and mere endorsement, and
how these are related to the probability of diffusion. A similar analysis could be profitably
applied to study the process of adoption of new technologies or behaviours in the context of
natural resource management. This type of analysis would suggest efficient ways to integrate
village leaders into formal water governance systems, and qualify the benefits of strength-
ening vertical links between local communities and governmental bodies operating at the
district level.
Network Dynamics and the Coevolution of Behaviour As mentioned in Sects. 3.1.2
and 3.1.3, the existing studies on the role of networks on cooperative behaviour mostly
focus on the evolution of behaviour on a fixed network structure, whose ties govern agents’
interaction. A few recent papers suggest that the explicit consideration of the co-evolution of
behaviour and of the underlying patterns of interaction may substantially enrich the steady
state prediction of cooperation. Hanaki et al. (2007) study a dynamic system where agents’
behaviour evolves by means of myopic and local imitation of other agents’ performances,
and the network evolves by means of myopic revisions of existing links. The evolution of
social ties is such that co-operators will sever links with defectors, resulting in co-operators
having more interactions and higher aggregate payoff than defectors. This would sustain
cooperation in the long run, provided the average clustering of the network is low enough for
defectors to remain isolated after a link is severed. The key insight here is that networks where
social relations are more intertwined and clustered may discourage cooperation in the long
run, precisely because defectors’ behaviour, which is more profitable if conducted within a
connected group, can be discontinued and isolated by link severance. As a result, groups of
co-operators may survive and even attract isolated defectors, resulting in the enlargement of
the scale of cooperation. In a related paper, Skyrms and Pemantle (2000) study the evolution
of repeated behavior within an evolving network, showing that the explicit modeling of the
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network dynamics may qualitatively change the behavioral prediction in steady state. By only
looking at random dyadic relations, and neglecting the role of indirect relation, this paper
neglects important features of networked interaction, but clearly highlights the importance
of co-evolution of behavior and social structure.
3.4 Networks, Coalitions and International Agreements
In this section we discuss two issues in international cooperation that would benefit from the
explicit consideration of networks and from the application of notions developed in network
economics. In a nutshell, in Sect. 3.4.1 we discuss new insights on the stability of cooperation
that would obtain from the explicit consideration of countries’ bilateral relations within a
cooperating coalition (here represented by a network). The focus here is on the way in
which the structure of bilateral relations within a cooperating coalition affects its stability. In
Sect. 3.4.2 we consider the process of coalition-building through sequential bilateral contacts,
and discuss the trade-offs between centralization and delegation of these contacts. The focus
here is, therefore, on the formation of a cooperating coalition and on the process that leads
to it.
3.4.1 The Internal Structure of Environmental Coalitions
A common, yet restrictive assumption in the economic literature of IEAs is that countries
are symmetric. When taken into consideration, asymmetries are typically modelled as differ-
ences in terms of costs and benefits of emission abatement. However, due to their history of
political, economic and cultural interactions, countries may also differ with respect to their
relationship and role within the process of building up cooperation (see Sect. 3.4.2). Because
of these differences, even within a cooperating coalition, certain countries may find it easy to
communicate and agree on proposals, while other countries may have little, if any, relations.
These differences in bilateral relations within the coalition are likely to characterize coun-
tries’ relations should the coalition break down and, with it, their possibilities of cooperation
after the break up. If, for instance, two countries A and B manage to cooperate within a
larger coalition only thanks to the mediation of a third country C, these two countries would
probably find it difficult to cooperate if C were to leave the coalition.
To put things more formally, we associate with the environmental coalition S a set of (pos-
sibly weighted) bilateral links, expressing, for each pair of countries in S, the strength of their
diplomatic, political and economic relationship. In the simplest case, we may think of a {0,1}
undirected network, where countries either communicate or not within S. The cornerstone of
our analysis is the mechanism described above: by describing countries’ bilateral relations,
the network predicts countries’ cooperation possibilities in case the coalition should break
apart. Consider, for instance, country 2 in the left panel of Fig. 8, mediating all other bilateral
relations; 2’s defection from the three-country coalition would cause a total breakdown of
Fig. 8 Internal structures of a
3-country coalition
(a) (b) 
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cooperation, as countries 1 and 3 would not be able (or would face prohibitively high costs)
to communicate. If 2 were to defect from a coalition internally structured as in the right panel
of Fig. 8, a smaller cooperating coalition with 1 and 3 as members would be possible.
What matters for our argument is the observation that, in the presence of spillovers, what
a country expects to obtain by defecting from a coalition crucially depends on the expected
patterns of cooperation after the defection. Free riding incentives are clearly maximal when
the remaining countries are expected to stay together and continue to cooperate. This is the
so-called “delta” assumption, and leads to the prediction of an endemic instability of cooper-
ation when spillovers are positive (as in the case of environmental agreements). Free riding
incentives are, instead, minimized when other countries are expected to stop cooperating
altogether after a defection—the “gamma” assumption – in which case global cooperation
has been shown to be possible (see Chander and Tulkens 1997). By specifying the internal
structure of a coalition, the network pins down countries’ expectations on post-defection
scenarios, and therefore their incentives. For instance, the gamma assumption is naturally
associated with country 2’s defection in network (a) of Fig. 8, while the delta assump-
tion would appropriately describe expectations after 1’s and 3’s defections. In general, the
defection of a sub-coalition S ⊂ N from the set N internally organized according to the
connected network gwould be followed by the partition π
(
g|N\S
)
of the remaining players
N\S, where each element of the partition corresponds to a component of the sub-network
g|N\S (see Sect. 2.1).
By shaping defectors’ incentives, relational networks endow a cooperating coalition with
specific stability properties that depend on the sign of coalitional spillovers. In Fig. 8, for
instance, the “star” network of the left panel provides all players with lower incentive to
defect under positive spillovers, and with higher incentives under negative spillovers, than the
complete network on the right panel. More generally, adding links to a given network always
has the effect of lowering incentives to defect under negative spillovers, and of increasing
these incentives under positive spillovers. This suggests that minimally connected structures
would endow the coalition with strong stability properties under positive spillovers.
Additionally, a very sparse internal structure would also limit the possibilities of coalitional
members to coordinate on defections. In the star network of Fig. 8, for instance, countries 1
and 3 would not be able to coordinate on a joint defection, unless they get player 2 involved.
This is not the case in the complete network, where 1 and 3 can autonomously take joint
decisions. The effect of the network on coordination was analysed by Demange (2004) in
standard cooperative games and by Currarini (2007) in games with spillovers. A basic insight
is that, under positive spillovers, sparse networks maximize coalitional stability by both
limiting the number and the profitability of potential defections. Things are more ambiguous
under negative spillovers: while sparse networks limit the number of potential defections,
they maximize their profitability, resulting in a trade-off that leaves space for intermediate
structure with average density.
While the above discussion stresses the role of the relational network in shaping players’
outside options, there are other ways in which the network is likely to affect players’ bargain-
ing power within the coalition. In the left panel of figure 8, while under positive spillovers
player 2 has a low outside option due to limited free riding possibilities, he is nevertheless
responsible for keeping the coalition united and, therefore, for generating the gains from
cooperation. This should increase its bargaining power compared to the complete network
(right panel), where 2 is not in such a pivotal position. This is indeed recognized by various
allocation rules that take account of the network, such as the Myerson Value, an extension of
the Shapley Value to cases where players’ cooperation possibilities are described by a net-
work. The main insight here is that while pivotal players enjoy a stronger bargaining position
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under negative spillovers, a trade-off obtains under positive ones, where pivotal players, who
play an essential role within the coalition, end up facing low outside options and, as a result,
weaker bargaining power. More research is needed to fully understand the interplay of the
different roles of the network in shaping agents bargaining power, and how this interplay
affects the stability of environmental coalitions.
3.4.2 Delegation and Centralization in the Build-up of Environmental Coalitions
The process by which environmental coalitions are formed can be varied and multifaceted, and
the timing and framing of negotiations is likely to matter for the final success of cooperation.
In particular, large coalitions are likely to be built gradually, with a limited number of very
committed members as first signatories, who then adopt various strategies to enlarge the
coalition.
The gradual process through which coalitions are built, and the amount of strategy
involved, are not the focus of the two main approaches to environmental coalitions, based on
the notion of core of a cooperative game (see Chander and Tulkens 1997), or on simultaneous
non cooperative models of coalition formation (as in Carraro and Siniscalco 1993 and Barrett
1994). In many instances of international environmental cooperation, however, one or more
countries have played the role of perpetrators of the process, either because more inclined to
solve global environmental problems, or because traditionally playing a leading role in the
international arena. Such countries face the task of building up a larger coalition by means of
several and successive individual contacts with other perspective members, through complex
negotiation processes. The design of such bilateral contacts is a crucial element of coopera-
tion, and attains to the timing of such contacts, their degree of centralization and delegation,
the personal involvement and commitment of perpetrators and of perspective members. The
perpetrator may, for instance, opt for multiple and simultaneous contacts with most of the
other potential members, adopting therefore a centralized procedure of coalition building.
Alternatively, it may identify a restricted set of players to contact in a first stage of negotiation,
and delegate to these players the task of further enlarging the coalition.
Both centralization and delegation have plausible pros and cons. Advocates of centraliza-
tion would probably stress the importance of a widespread use of the authority and charisma
of the perpetrator, whose central role would be interpreted as signal of its commitment to the
cooperation process. Delegation would probably be preferred when diplomatic, geographical
and historical relations between countries are very heterogeneous, and the initial perpetrator
would lack the necessary information and/or diplomatic strength to successfully negotiate
with certain potential new members. In these cases, the perpetrator may better serve the final
goal of global cooperation by delegating the creation of new contacts.
The choice between delegation and centralization involves other, less obvious, aspects that
are strictly related to the economics of cooperation and to the resulting patterns of strategic
interaction. In this section we discuss such aspects, frame them in a stylized example of coali-
tional externalities, and claim that a general analysis of these issues would greatly benefit from
the use of network formation theory and from our knowledge of strategic interdependence in
networks. To fix ideas, consider the following three-player example, developed in full detail in
Currarini and Feri (2006). A perpetrator i has the task of building up a coalition with two other
players, j and k. The benefits from cooperation are captured by a partition function v, mapping
each partition of the set of players into a vector of payoffs, specifying an aggregate payoff for
each coalition in that partition. Formally, we let v(S, π) denote the value generated by S in the
partition π. In our example, we set v ({i} , {i, j, k}) = v ({ j} , {i, j, k}) = v ({k} , {i, j, k})
and v ({i j} , {i j, k}) = v ({ik} , {ik, j}) = v ({ jk} , {i, jk}) by symmetry. We also assume
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Fig. 9 Centralised (left) versus
decentralised (right) contacts
that the grand coalition {ijk}is efficient, by this meaning that it generates a higher aggregate
payoff than any other partition of the players’ set: v ({123} , {123}) ≥ ∑S∈π v (S, π) ,∀π .
The perpetrator i designs the structure of his contacts with j and k. Either i contacts j and
k simultaneously, proposing to form a coalition of three players, or sequentially, contacting
j first, proposing him to join the forming coalition, and delegating him the task of enlarging
the coalition to k. In other words, i admits j in the coalition, and transfers to j the technology
to negotiate with k. The assumption that the perpetrator can commit not to contact agent k
when delegating to agent j the contracting power is crucial and considerably simplifies the
equilibrium analysis and allows us to get a first very sharp intuition. The two scenarios are
illustrated in Fig. 9.
In the first centralized scenario, j and k simultaneously receive an offer. For both of them
to accept, the offered monetary payoff has to exceed the outside option given that the other
has accepted. These outside options are v({ j} , { j, ik} = v({k} , {k, i j}. If the perpetrator
delegates, then player j needs to receive at least what he would get by rejecting the offer,
which is v ({ j} , {i, j, k}). Player k’s payoff when contacted by j would instead be at least
v({k} , {i j, k}, his outside option if rejecting to join the coalition.
Summing up, the perpetrator needs to give up different slices of the total cake in the
two alternative regimes: by centralizing contacts, i gives up v({ j} , { j, ik} + v({k} , {k, i j};
by delegating, i gives up v ({ j} , { j, i, k}) + v({k} , {k, i j}. Which regime is preferred by
the perpetrator clearly depends on whether v({ j} , { j, i, k} > v({ j} , { j, ik} or, instead,
v({ j} , { j, i, k} < v({ j} , { j, ik}. In the terminology of coalitional games, it depends on
whether agents face negative or positive coalitional spillovers. In particular, the perpetrator
will prefer centralized contacts when spillovers are negative, and sequential contacts when
spillovers are positive. Also, when there are intrinsic reasons to centralize contacts (based,
as we said, on the perpetrator authority), there is a trade-off between these reasons and the
strategic incentives to free ride in a centralized process, and this trade-off may be resolved
in favour of delegation the stronger free riding incentives and/or the weaker the perpetrator’s
authority.
The role of externalities on outside options, bargaining power and the resulting structure
of contracts has been stressed in various papers in the contracts literature. Genicot and Ray
(2006) suggest that the presence of negative externalities may induce the principal to first
contract a subset of players, and then extend contracts to other individual players—a sort of
divide and conquer strategy. Similar insights are present in Galasso (2008). The main insight
here is that the first set of contracts has the purpose of decreasing the outside options of the
remaining players, who are then contracted at better conditions for the principal. The reason
why a fully centralised structure is not optimal in these papers is that players can coordinate
before responding to the principal’s offer. Another difference with our stylized example
above is that the principal cannot commit to transferring the contracting power to the agents.
A similar mechanism underlies the analysis of centralized contracts with externalities by
Segal (1999), where is shown that positive externalities may induce the principal to delegate
inefficiently low activity levels, in the attempt to lower agents’ outside options and retain
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a larger share of the social surplus. A general setting that extends the three-player example
described above to many agents is the sequential “link formation and bargaining” game in
Currarini and Morelli (2000). There, the sequential formation of links has been shown to
induce efficiency in the absence of externalities, thus overlooking the free riding incentives
and their effects on coalition formation. Also, although in that paper the principal can decide
whether to simultaneously offer a link to all agents or to delegate to the second agent in
the protocol the task to form further links, the principal cannot retain the exclusive right to
propose contract. The centralized contracting situation realizes therefore only if all agents
reciprocate the principal’s link offer and do not form links among themselves.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have discussed how network economics can help to model and analyse a
variety of environmental problems, and what new insights can result. In this final section, we
wish to offer some further thoughts on the relationship between network density and cooper-
ative behaviour; an issue, which arises, in one way or another, in all the applications we have
considered in this survey. Specifically: what type of local interaction promotes cooperative
(and socially efficient) behaviour? Are dense networks more conducive to cooperation than
sparse one? Is symmetry in social relations beneficial to pro-social behaviour? In Sect. 3.1,
we have seen how the use of evolutionary game theoretic models has lead to the conclusion
that cooperation is harder to sustain in large populations. This is due to the large benefits
from defection when the number of interactions increases. Hence, this is not a statement
about the size of overall population, but rather one about the number of social relations.
Increasing population size with a constant number of interactions (that is, decreasing net-
work density), does not affect the defectors’ incentives; however, as pointed out by Coleman
(1988), the degree of clustering (or closure) in social relations matters for cooperation, as
mutual acquaintances provide reinforcement and monitoring of virtuous behaviour. Jackson
and Yariv 2011 reach a similar conclusion in a fully fledged game theoretical model of favor
exchange, which shows that forward looking rational agents cooperate only if they share one
or more common neighbors. So, a larger total population may hinder cooperation if it comes
at the cost of lower clustering. This common view has been challenged by works, such as
Hanaki et al. (2007), where sparseness is claimed to promote cooperation by favoring the
enlargement of cooperative groups to defectors. Here the main force promoting large-scale
cooperation is the asymmetry of social relations, so that isolated defectors may turn into
co-operators by imitating well-connected (and happier) co-operators. Arguments in favour
of asymmetries in the network structure also come from other recent papers, where scale
free distributions are found to favour pro-social behaviour (see Sect. 3.1.2). In Sect. 3.4 we
have then discussed a different mechanism relating the density of a network of cooperators
with the stability of cooperation. We have there studied a construct where the components
of a network represent groups of cooperators (the “coalitions” of cooperative game theory),
endowed with an internal structure of bilateral relations. We have argued that the topology
of a component affects the incentives of its members to break out by shaping their outside
options. This happens when defectors use the network topology to predict future coopera-
tive scenarios after their defection. Dense networks, robust to the deletion of nodes, favor
defectors in public good games, where the disruption of cooperation would act as a punish-
ment, and are therefore little apt to sustain cooperation. A similar insight is present in Hanaki
et al. (2007), where high clustering prevents cooperation by limiting the possibility of indi-
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vidual agents to exclude defectors from the benefits of interacting with cooperators. By the
same token, when the disruption of cooperation is beneficial for defectors, as in pure conflict
or bargaining games, dense network structures promote cooperation by ensuring that some
cohesive structure will endure after the defection of one or more players. In sum, the nature
of the relationship between network density and cooperation ultimately depends on the type
of interaction at work: high density tends to favor cooperative behavior when spillovers are
negative across groups (the typical case in environmental games), and to hamper it when
spillovers are positive.
Local interaction and network structures seem to bear potential applications in other envi-
ronmental problems that we have not covered here, including multi-issues environmental
negotiations, issue linkage, trans-boundary pollution problems, biodiversity and conserva-
tion, peer effects in health related behaviour with externalities (such as smoking), fisheries
management, risk assessment and others. We hope that the present paper can stimulate
research on these topics, both theoretical and applied, explicitly embedding networks in the
traditional models of environmental economics. Some of these applications are the subject
of our current research.
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